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Abstract 
This research has two objectives. First, using DoD acquisition data, the study details 
the process developed to mine, convert, and use DoD acquisition schedule data, including a 
discussion on how the data was refined. Part of this effort was an identification of the factors 
that caused delays. This data is used to describe a method for project managers to use in 
their project planning process. 
Introduction 
Department of Defense (DoD) project management is focused on awareness, 
anticipation, and decision-making. In order to address these three imperatives, project and 
program managers in the DoD must plan in detail the expected path and duration of 
development projects as senior leadership requires reports on progress relative to a plan. 
However, since the nature of the weapons development process (R&D) is so uncertain and 
the scheduling tools provided are, at best, stochastic, there is a need for better 
understanding of the many factors that influence activity/task planning, network 
development and project execution. This understanding includes ways to estimate schedule 
beyond the stochastic methods of today. This research has two objectives. First, using the 
OSD acquisition information databases, determine and develop ways to extract and make 
that information on scheduling available to DoD project managers. The second goal is to 
identify important delay factors, so those factors can be considered in project planning.  
This research uses DoD acquisition data to inform the schedule planning process. 
Specifically, it identifies the many factors that have historically led to schedule delays and 
provides a methodology for PMOs to use when they plan and schedule their weapons 
system program. This study has three parts. First is an examination of the literature on the 
current state of schedule estimating. The second part describes the process developed for 
this study to mine, convert, and use DoD acquisition data, including a discussion on how the 
data was refined. The last section presents some initial findings from this research and 
proposes some uses for the information.  
The widely used definition of a project includes the assumption that each project is 
something unique: “[a] project is a temporary endeavor undertaken to create a unique 
product, service or result” (Project Management Institute [PMI], 2017). Perhaps it is not. 
Instead, perhaps a project is not unique, and perhaps we can use the experience the DoD 
has in project management to our benefit. That is the value of using data in defense 
acquisition.  
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As long ago as 1988, Morris and Hough were critical of the practice of project 
management: 
Curiously, despite the enormous attention project management and analysis 
have received over the years, the track record of projects is fundamentally 
poor, particularly for the larger and more difficult ones. Overruns are 
common. Many projects appear as failures, particularly in the public view. 
Projects are often completed late or over budget, do not perform in the way 
expected, involve severe strain on participating institutions or are cancelled 
prior to their completion after the expenditure of considerable sums of money. 
(Morris & Hough, 1988) 
Instead, the basic premise of this study is to address this criticism head-on and 
suggest instead, that maybe … when problems persist, practitioners and scholars are 
getting something wrong (Christensen & Bartman, 2016). Therefore, this study explores how 
to find and use data to help PMs understand the dynamic nature of weapon system 
development.  
Managing defense acquisition schedules has become even more important in recent 
years for many reasons including the following: 
 Longer “cycle times” for defense acquisition programs, especially for high-
priority combat systems—in both absolute and relative terms 
 The rise of competitor nations with greatly increased capabilities, 
sophistication, and agility—threatening U.S. national interests (getting inside 
our development cycle) 
 Significantly limited resources available for defense modernization programs, 
which makes management of funding profiles especially important 
This research explores one of the available sources of acquisition data, the Selected 
Acquisition Report (SAR). SAR data is collected and stored in the Defense Acquisition 
Management Information Retrieval (DAMIR) database, a repository for, inter alia, the DoD 
Selected Acquisition Reports (SAR). The SAR is a summary of the acquisition data of 
selected Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAP). SARs are required by Title 10 USC 
§ 2432 to be submitted to Congress periodically.  
Weapons system development projects are infamous for exceeding time and cost 
constraints. Study of this time phenomena however, generally focuses on the resultant time 
it takes to develop a weapon system, not the front-end planning necessary to address 
schedule overruns. We examine this topic first by reviewing the basics of project scheduling, 
then examining the project planning process and how scheduling is currently done, what is 
considered in the development of project schedules, as well as what should be considered.  
Project Scheduling 
The concept of time in project management can be divided into two major categories: 
task duration estimation, and task sequencing and project scheduling. First, the technical 
process of estimating the duration of the project task must be determined. Once duration is 
established, the management process of project sequencing and scheduling must be 
defined.  
Broad review of the literature on project scheduling reveals research roughly divided 
into three areas. First, the bulk of literature on scheduling is devoted to the networking and 
probabilistic techniques which have dominated schedule estimation since the 1960s. This 
focus is logical in that the “science” of scheduling originated with the almost simultaneous 
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development of the critical path method (CPM), and the Program Evaluation and Review 
Technique (PERT). CPM or critical path method places activities in a logical network 
sequence. When completed, this sequence is expressed as a network and provides the total 
time necessary to accomplish the project, as well as the total time of the individual activities 
which is expressed as the critical path. PERT also used in building the network provides a 
probabilistic assessment of the actual schedule time. PERT (also known as three-point 
estimation) uses the weighted average of three measures of task duration, the most likely 
duration (M), the pessimistic duration (P), and the optimistic duration (O).  
The strength of CPM and PERT (apart from the fact they are used almost exclusively 
in schedule development, and in most enterprise project management software packages) is 
it allows management focus by identifying the critical path, thus, the key activities that must 
be monitored and controlled. Monitoring provides a means to oversee costs including, 
among others, anticipating personnel changes. Controlling allows the PM to determine 
whether the project is on schedule, as well as ensuring the defined length of the project is 
met.  
Disadvantages include project management being unable to react to instability and 
changes, as well as managing resources to “feed” the critical path and not being able to 
“see” and comprehend the overall effort. This is because CPM and PERT take a static view 
of project activities—which fails to account for the relationships and interdependencies 
inherent in complex projects (Balaji & James, 2005).  
Second is the basic assumption that work proceeds as planned in the network—that 
there is a direct flow from work to be done, to work accomplished. That is, every task has a 
discrete start and end—work is either started or not, finished or not. More importantly, there 
is no accommodation for work that might not be done correctly or to the required quality. 
Further, the subjective nature of defining not only the most likely time duration, but also the 
optimistic and pessimistic durations potentially magnifies schedule uncertainty especially in 
large, complex projects (Franck et al., 2017). A last disadvantage of the current scheduling 
method is that it does not recognize management decisions and the feedback from those 
decisions. 
The next major area in the schedule literature examines project schedule from the 
perspective of the time it takes to develop weapons systems. This research focus assesses 
schedules by asking the question, “Why does weapon system development take so long?” 
Central to this line of research is the idea of “cycle time,” also referred to as “schedule 
interval.” The issue examined is how to provide weapons systems to the operational force 
as soon as possible. Research questions ask, “Has the time to develop weapons systems 
increased?” (Van Atta et al., 2015). 
The final area of research interest is that of software project estimation. This area 
represents the focus of the most recent research. Some suggest that because of the 
complexity of software, as well as the degree of software in most modern weapons systems, 
software schedule estimation most closely resembles weapons system development 
scheduling. 
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Estimating Activity Duration 
Surprisingly, little information is available in the literature on the “how” to estimate the 
measures of a schedule—the task duration. While the major defense contractors have 
formal in-company processes, little formal literature is available on the specifics of task 
estimation. Further, most available information on estimating task duration is found in project 
management textbooks, but even then, the specifics are scarce.  
There are however, similarities between cost estimating and activity duration 
estimating. This is because accurate cost estimates require the insight into scope and 
schedule that only duration estimating can provide. Both processes use similar techniques. 
Both depend on expert judgment, both use parametric methods, and both employ a 
bottoms-up methodology as one of the techniques is estimated at the task level, then rolled 
up. Central, however, to schedule estimation is the idea of sequencing. The network is a 
central element of determining duration.  
The PMBOK (Project Management Body of Knowledge) lists five methods for 
estimating project activity duration. These methods include the following (PMI, 2017): 
 Expert Judgment  
 Alternatives Analysis  
 Published Estimating Data  
 Project Management Software  
 Bottoms-Up Estimating 
Expert judgment acknowledges that technical and engineering experts should be 
able to estimate the effort necessary to accomplish tasks and translate those estimates to 
duration. This assumes the chosen experts have significant experience in the execution of 
those tasks and are therefore competent to judge time required (Hughes, 1996). 
Alternatives analysis recognizes that activities or tasks can be accomplished in 
different ways—alternatives. These different ways include defining different techniques, 
differing levels of resources, and using different machines. 
Published estimates are databanks that gather resources measures. These 
measures include hourly rates by skill level, acknowledged production rates for various 
development and manufacturing activities. In most cases, this data is available internal to 
the organization. However, there are data companies that track and report this data. An 
example is the IEEE-USA Salary & Benefits Survey. This data is often available for different 
locations in the United States, as well as worldwide.  
Project management software is not really an estimation method. Instead, it provides 
a means to identify and organize information necessary for resource estimates.  
Finally, an engineering or bottoms-up estimate is a comprehensive schedule (and 
cost) process that starts at the work package level and aggregates costs to build a complete 
estimate. Bottoms-up estimates are necessary when schedule activities cannot be 
accurately estimated using another technique. As the name implies, bottoms-up estimates 
start at a level of activity or task that can be confidently estimated. The activities are then 
rolled-up to the required level. These estimates are extremely work-intensive but are also 
the most accurate.  
Other recognized methods include parametric techniques. A parametric or top-down 
estimate builds an activity estimate for the development project from historical data 
comparing variables through a statistical relationship. All the methods listed are used to 
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estimate the length of time each of the activities or Work Breakdown Structure tasks lists. 
“Simply stated, the duration of an activity is the scope of the work (quantity) divided by a 
measure of productivity” (Hendrickson et al., 1987, p. 278). 
Thus, activity duration estimation establishes the actual time required to complete 
discrete tasks in an overall project, while project scheduling fixes the start and end dates, as 
well as execution approaches of the project. Once the overall schedule is established, 
management activities driven by either time or resource constraints will determine the actual 
execution of the project (Schwindt & Zimmerman, 2015). The analogy that comes to mind is 
that of an orchestra. The individual instruments (and of course, the musicians) are the 
discrete tasks of the project. The orchestra leader is the project manager, and the music 
score is the “plan” the orchestra leader uses to execute the “project.” Building on this 
information, the next step in this effort is to identify schedule data that can be used to 
augment these estimating activities. 
Data Methodology 
While there is significant information available on DoD procurements, the 
overwhelming majority of that information is on cost. Cost is tracked and reported in detail at 
both the service as well as DoD level, and there is significant numerical-type data available 
on cost. Cost is also reported in a format that lends itself to analysis (spreadsheets). In fact, 
both in government and industry, cost is significantly more frequently reviewed than 
schedule (Smith & Friedman, 1980). 
Schedule information, on the other hand, is reported by DoD program managers, but 
normally in prose or tables in reports such as the SARs and others. The challenge for this 
effort was to identify schedule data and render it into a form that can be mathematically 
compared and examined. This section discusses the process developed to convert schedule 
information into schedule data. 
Data for this research was obtained from the Defense Acquisition Management 
Information Retrieval (DAMIR) database, a repository for, inter alia, the DoD Selected 
Acquisition Reports (SAR). The SAR is a summary of the acquisition data of selected Major 
Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAP). SARs are required by Title 10 USC § 2432 which 
states, 
The Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress at the end of each fiscal-
year quarter a report on current major defense acquisition programs. Except 
as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3), each such report shall include a status 
report on each defense acquisition program that at the end of such quarter is 
a major defense acquisition program. Reports under this section shall be 
known as Selected Acquisition Reports.  
The available DAMIR database includes SARs from 1997 to 2017. The schedule 
section of the report consists of a Gantt chart and table showing the major milestones and 
current estimates. Figure 1 is an example of the schedule data found in a SAR. The section 
titled Change Explanations (CE) provides a description of the schedule changes. Both the 
graphic and the change explanation sections are rendered as unformatted text. 
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Figure 1. SAR Schedule of Data Example 
The information reported by the program managers in the SAR consists of an 
executive summary, a brief description of the overall program with separate sections for 
major subprograms and identification of threshold breaches and discussions on cost, 
schedule, and/or performance issues. The database can be searched by program and year. 
Data accessibility work by OSD now provides the possibility of extracting SAR data from 
PDF forms into a spreadsheet. Specific queries allow an analyst to mine particular sections 
of the SAR, to include that used for this effort—schedule. The extracted data for schedule 
includes program information, key dates (milestones) and other identifying information. 
However, the data describing what changed and by how much is provided as text. Thus, a 
process needed to be developed to convert textual explanations to normalized, measurable 
data.  
The total number of schedule records in the available SAR database was 3,969. The 
data used in this study are a subset of the SAR reports of 1,224 programs from 1997 to 
2017. Each program potentially had between one and 20 entries (corresponding to the 20-
years period and depending on when the program was initiated, and whether any schedule 
changes were reported). Of those 1224 programs, the available SAR schedule data 
consisted of 1,948 entries in the “change explanation” (CE) field of the database. In this 
preliminary study, those systems with no entries in the CE field were not examined. Table 1 
details the overall data.  
Table 1. Overall SAR Data Information, 1997–2017 
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Central to an understanding of weapon system scheduling (and as a way of 
converting change explanation text to data) is an examination of those factors that 
historically have led to increases in weapon system development times. The major studies 
of the past two decades have identified a number of factors that have contributed to 
increased duration. Thus, the next step was to identify these factors. A literature review 
revealed several studies that have classified weapon system development delay factors. An 
example of the explanations includes budget, funding, complexity, technical difficulty, and 
requirements stability (Drezner & Smith, 1990; Smith & Friedman, 1980; Van Atta et al., 
2015). A list of these project delay factors is at Table 2. Not all these previously identified 
delay factors were evident in this study; however these factors provided a starting point for 
this analysis. 
Table 2. Identified Generic Factors Causing Delays in Weapons System 
Development 
 
The classification of the change explanation (CE) entries was a two-step process. 
First, each change explanation was examined and a determination on causality made. Using 
the abovementioned factors as a classification mechanism, in the first pass, the project 
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office change explanations were examined, and an initial determination of the schedule 
factor(s) was identified. It became clear in this preliminary analysis that in many cases, there 
was more than one cause of the delay. Those explanations with more than one cause were 
initially classified, then further refined. Those entries that required further analysis were 
flagged in order to return and further refine the classification. Some data were not assigned 
a code because of either duplicative information, or because of what appeared to be 
arbitrary schedule updates that appeared to be no real changes in schedule activities. Table 
3 shows the delay factors identified/determined in this analysis, and the number of identified 
cases of each factor. Numbers do not total because of more than one factor identified on 
some of the programs. 
Table 3. Minimum and Maximum Schedule Delays (Months) 
 
The last step in the analytical process was to record the actual reported delays. The 
delays were listed in the SAR as dates. That required conversion from dates into a uniform 
format (months). Delays ranged from one month at the low end to 168 months on the high 
end. The delays were tracked to the identified factors. There were 1,216 instances of 
increases in time, and 150 instances of decreases in time. The delay factors, minimum and 
maximum delays, are shown in Table 3. Note that in some cases, dates were brought 
forward. In this case, those dates were noted as minus (-) numbers, representing a possible 
decrease in the schedule. In practice, however, a decrease in schedule captured in this 
manner is misleading since it is taken out of the context of the overall project. Over 95% of 
deceases noted were administrative in nature and either were corrections to mistakes 
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recorded in previous SARs, or a reflection of actual dates versus planned dates. For 
purposes of this initial analysis, decreases were not examined. 
Delay Factor Explanations 
 Administrative changes include schedule updates because of APB and ADM 
changes, as well as changes including program restructuring as a function of 
decisions driven by Nunn-McCurdy results and program restructuring.  
 Schedule changes identified those changes reported as a result of 
acknowledgement of the actual date of occurrence. These changes are also 
the result of receipt of approval documents from Milestone Decision 
Authorities to change specific dates. 
 Technical schedule changes are a result of specific setbacks in technical 
development.  
 Testing delays include both the ability to meet scheduled test dates, as well 
as technical issues discovered in the conduct of testing. When the testing 
discovered a technical issue, that technical issue was also counted as a 
technical problem. 
 Explanations that produced no apparent changes in the schedule data reflect 
comments in the change explanation, but do not produce an actual change in 
the schedule. Examples include cases of achievement of IOC/FOC, as well 
as re-designations of milestones driven by ADM decisions. 
 Delay in availability of key capabilities/facilities are a result of weather delays 
including satellite launches. 
 Budget/Funding Delays are tied to specific notes on lack of budget, decrease 
in budget or changes by Congress to the specific program. 
 Delays attributed to the Contractor result from construction and delivery 
delays as well as delays attributed to delivery of subcontractor materials. 
 Delays because of Rework reflect both quality issues where the budgeted 
work must be redone in order to make it functional, as well as the 
feedback/follow-on problems caused throughout the development. 
 Force Majeure are external events such as inflation, earthquakes, labor 
strikes, etc.  
 Delays due to Contracting/Contract Negotiation stem from either problems in 
negotiation, delays in approvals for RFP releases, modification to contracts, 
or delays in awarding contracts. 
 Actuals are the language used to describe simple updates to previously 
reported dates. 
The CE section included the table described above; however the information was 
unformatted. In some cases, numerous dates for different events had changed and were 
reported. For purposes of this initial research effort, the date captured was the longest 
duration activity shown. Future efforts will identify and report all events. 
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Analysis 
One of the objectives of this research was to identify, analyze, and provide those 
schedule factors causing delays in weapons system development. The final aspect of this 
study is to explore how the data extracted from this SAR analysis can be used to assist in 
schedule planning and development. The tools of scheduling (currently based on the CPM 
and PERT techniques discussed above) apply a network approach to define critical 
activities, slack, and the overall time required to complete the development. The network 
approach also provides the basis for cost estimation, resource allocation, management 
focus and risk assessment, and provides a visual flow of the effort. However, 
notwithstanding decades of study and countless man-years of experience, we are still 
missing something. One of those things we are missing is an acknowledgement of the 
dynamic nature of projects. Our current static view starting with planning has to change. A 
first step is to review the delay factors evident in the past 20 years of DoD Major Defense 
Acquisition Programs (MDAP). As a minimum, incorporating factors identified in both the 
planning and execution process could be a start. 
The delay factors suggest PMs should attempt to plan for the time necessary to deal 
with oversight, information reporting and both the time takes, as well as the impacts of 
decisions—internal and external to the program. As the GAO pointed out in a 2015 study, 
the program office overheads associated with administrative activities added on an average 
of two years to complete: 
Programs we surveyed spent on average over 2 years completing the steps 
necessary to document up to 49 information requirements for their most 
recent acquisition milestone. This includes the time for the program office to 
develop the documentation and for various stakeholders to review and 
approve the documentation. (GAO, 2015) 
For example, the GAO found that the F-22 Increment $3.2 billion Modernization 
spent 3,800 staff days to prepare 33 milestone documents and present 74 briefings for the 
Milestone B process (GAO, 2015). This work had a cost of some $10 million. Those 3,800 
staff days obviously would also have impacts on the schedule, potentially more significant 
than on cost. This is not to argue the necessity for the program office to gather this 
information. Instead, it is a factor that should be accounted for in the program scheduling 
plan.  
Figure 2 shows the cumulative schedule overrun hours for all programs analyzed in 
the period of 1997 to 2017. Of note are years 2010 and 2011 where the year-to-year 
increase in time is an order of magnitude larger than that any other year. This particular 
jump in delay was caused by the CVN-78 program.   
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Figure 2. Sum of Schedule Delays by Year, 1998–2017 
Figure 3 provides a trend line and forecast of the delay. Using this data, the forecast 
total delay hours across all programs in 2019 equals 712 hours, and in 2020 that forecast 
increases to 729 hours.  
 
Figure 3. Forecast Total Hours for 2019 and 2020 
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Figure 4 shows the hours overrun by program for the same period. While there is no 
real proven correlation between schedule and cost overruns, the fact that the overruns are 
significant in this representative group of programs emphasizes the scope of the problem. 
And cost is not the only aspect involved. The delays also reflect added time before the 
systems are in the hands of the warfighters. 
 
Figure 4. Total Hours Overrun by Program, 1997–2017 
Using the Data 
The last step in this research is to suggest a way for DoD program managers to use 
the data that comes from this examination of delay factors. As noted above, the CPM/ PERT 
approach to scheduling precludes the use of historical data at the program schedule level. 
And, while some companies track task estimation data, that data is often proprietary, and 
more focused on technical process estimation.  
The basic assumption that work proceeds as planned in the network from start to 
finish is naïve at best (Franck et al., 2017). This static view provided by traditional project 
scheduling ignores the reality of project management that the work might not be done 
correctly or to the necessary quality (Cooper, 1993c). This same view also fails to consider 
that the results of decisions, whether good or bad, cause reactions in the project, much as 
inputs results in outputs in any system. Weapon system development reality using classical 
network analysis cannot delineate the progress of a project (Williams et al., 1994). 
Therefore, we should consider alternate ways of examining these problems. 
System dynamics “deals with the time-dependent behavior of managed systems with 
the aim of describing the system and understanding through quantitative and qualitative 
models” (Coyle, 1996). Instead of the static view we are used to seeing in defense 
acquisition projects, system dynamics considers weapon systems development as a system, 
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with inputs and outputs. Further, the rework cycle proposed by Cooper, also helps explain 
one of the project dynamics present in every development (Cooper, 1993a). Figure 5 shows 
the rework cycle. The concept is simple: Not all work attempted is completed correctly the 
first time. And, that work not completed correctly is not recognized. That work, initially 
undiscovered is at some point discovered and then moves into the “known rework” block. 
That known rework must be redone, both delaying completion of the overall project, and 
costing more. In practice, this effectively represents an increase in the work to be done. 
 
Figure 5. The Rework Cycle 
The notations “people” and “productivity” flow into a valve that further controls the 
flow of work from that needing to be done to that work completed. People are the number of 
workers, and their level of training and expertise. Productivity is a measure of their 
efficiency. Simple scheduling in this instance takes the number of people times their 
efficiency and applies that to the number of tasks in the Work to be Done stock. 
The rework cycle is a fundamental system dynamics concept first articulated by 
Cooper (Cooper, 1993a, 1993b, 1993c). The basic flow of work in a development is from 
work to be done (tasks or work packages) to work completed. Connecting that flow is a 
“valve” that regulates the flow. In the rework cycle, that flow is determined by people 
(numbers, skills, availability) and productivity. People times productivity provides a flow rate, 
for example: tasks per month. Quality is another modulator of the flow of work. Quality is 
simply a measure of whether the task was accomplished correctly and completely. Given the 
exploratory nature of research and development efforts, it is entirely possible that a planned 
development task fails to accomplish the task goal, and the task must be redone. Similarly, 
people may be operating at a high level of productivity, but not producing quality work. 
There are two types of rework, known and undiscovered. These categories are 
integral to the nature of weapons system development. Developmental test does identify 
some of the work that needs to be redone, and that work flows to the known rework stock. 
However, there is work that may pass developmental test, but is later found to be deficient 
(software “bugs” are a good example). Those deficiencies may not be discovered for 
significant amounts of time and may also cause follow-on developmental efforts to slow or 
fail until they are finally discovered. Rework is generally a known issue for experienced 
project managers and was reported in some of the SAR data used in this study. 
Understanding the impact of the rework cycle coupled with the effects of other delay factors 
can provide project managers a tool to develop better schedule estimates. 
Figure 6 shows a simplified, generic project with 1,000 tasks, executed by 10 people 
at a notional 90% productivity rate. The X-axis shows months, and the Y-axis shows the 
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number of tasks. The graph shows both a steady reduction in work to be done, and an 
equally steady increase in the work completed. The graph shows completion of these 1,000 
tasks at month 117.5. This representation of a CPM type schedule represents a 
deterministic view of a project that doesn’t allow for delays or changes. This is one of the 
limitations of CPM and PERT and is recognized. Adding probability calculations to these 
schedules attempt to make them more realistic, but the root problem remains (Kerzner, 
2013; Moder et al., 1983).  
 
Figure 6. Model Showing the Effects of Rework 
Figure 7 shows the results from the same generic model used in Figure 6, but this 
time incorporates the impact of the rework cycle. The X-axis shows time, and the Y-axis 
indicates number of tasks. Line A shows the Work Completed, line B shows Work to be 
Done, and line C shows a generic calculation of Rework. Comparing line A in this graph to 
that of work completed plot in Figure 6, demonstrates the effects of rework. In this case 
rework peaks at week 48 (line C) and is estimated at 75%. This means three of every four 
tasks must be redone, by some measures a conservative estimate especially when 
considering software development projects (Cooper & Mullen, 1993). Similarly, line B (Work 
to be Done) shows a much longer completion time than that of Figure 6. Completion time in 
this model run is 229 weeks, an increase of 111.5 weeks over the generic model in Figure 1, 
an almost 100% increase in schedule. Another way of considering the impact of rework is 
that instead of the 1000 tasks originally required, the number of tasks completed was 
1,437—a significant increase in work requiring more time and money.  
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Figure 7. Model Showing the Effects of Rework 
While this is an elementary model, it demonstrates that something as simple as 
rework can have a significant effect on project schedules.  
A tool used in system dynamics to capture cause and effect is a causal map. The 
causal map becomes a tool used for the development of a model of the delay factors 
identified. Figure 8 is an initial causal loop diagram capturing some of the identified factors 
in weapons system program schedule delays. The factors shown are a subset of those 
identified for brevity in this paper.  
 
Figure 8. Delay Factors Triggers for Project Delays 
(Howick, 2003) 
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Delay factors plus the effects of rework, decision wait time, tasks start delay, and 
other disruptions result in the PM (or PMO) recognizing a schedule problem (delay in the 
critical path). Invariably, the PM must take action to attempt to return the project to the 
equilibrium expressed as being on schedule. This, the PM could approve overtime, 
reschedule, or take some other mitigation. The pressure to get back on schedule is driven 
by many factors including cost considerations, pressure from the oversight organizations, 
and in weapons systems development, the necessity of delivering capability to the 
warfighter in the most efficient time. Regardless of the reason, the PM “does something.” 
The plus and minus signs indicate the effect of the actions taken.  
The project is a dynamic system with feedback loops, and invariably decisions taken 
to address one problem have impact on or create new problems. For example, approving 
overtime does initially address schedule issues as more work is being done in shorter 
periods. However, a recognized problem of overtime is fatigue. Fatigue causes workers to 
make mistakes, and those mistakes result in having to redo the work, thus perpetuating 
problems that were thought solved.  
Similarly, hiring more workers causes more problems. Assuming the new workers 
have the requisite skills, they need to be trained/ acclimated to the actual project situation. In 
the Mythical Man Month, Brooks (1995) explained how this concept works in software 
development. In reality, it is universal (Brooks, 1995).  
Finally, while many of the delay factors identified from the SAR analysis can be 
explained in Figure 4, others require further examination. One of the biggest challenges is 
the area of decisions, both internal and external. The internal decisions drive many of the 
actors discussed above. However, the PM must also deal with external decisions that can 
eventually impact the development.  
Figure 9 is a notional graphic that represents a generic decision cycle in the context 
of the rework cycle. While the results of this data analysis included rework, the majority of 
the identified delay factors were decision-focused. Those decision centric factors included 
represent this decision cycle. The notation is shown between the work to be done and work 
completed boxes because many of the decisions identified occur outside the project 
manager’s purview. The exogenous factors identified cause either reactions to those factors, 
or force other internal decisions. While not normally a part of the rework cycle, we suggest 
that a formal appreciation of a decision cycle, and the time it takes for decisions to be made 
both internal as well as external to the program management cycle must be considered.  
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Figure 9. Notional Decision Cycle Added to Rework Cycle Diagram 
Conclusion 
No program manager sets out to overrun a schedule. “However, clients increasingly 
value not only cost and schedule control but cost and schedule certainty” (Godlewski et al., 
2012, p. 18). Those clients for defense acquisition products seek certainty as well, both in 
cost and schedule. It is no secret that current methods for estimating and executing 
schedule are insufficient. In fact, certainty is one of the potential benefits of this examination 
of schedule factors. Project certainty starts in effective schedule planning.  
This study presented a methodology to extract and identify schedule information 
from Selected Acquisition Reports, as well as a process for identifying classifying delay 
factors in weapons system acquisition programs. Finally, the study presented a suggested 
adjunct to the current scheduling methods that would allow project managers to use 
historically accurate delay factors to augment their decision processes. 
This exploration of the big data aspects of defense acquisition is the first step in a 
continuing effort to explore not only details of schedule, but broader details and insights on 
the way we manage defense acquisition programs. The next step is to link the insights 
gained from this look at the scheduling part of the SAR to the Acquisition Program baseline 
(APB). The APB, oft referenced in this effort, is the vehicle to explore the entire scheduling 
history of an acquisition. This, we believe, could provide a better understanding of the 
causes of the delays by establishing a trace between results reported in a SAR, to the factor 
that caused the delay. 
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